

2/8/61

PFIAB/NSC Review
Completed.**POSSIBLE MATTERS OF INTEREST TO THE COORDINATION STAFF**

Basic functions. One of the first tasks of the Director of Central Intelligence's new Coordination Staff will almost inevitably involve an identification of the primary functions of the Staff. For whereas it is true that the recommendations of the Joint Study Group suggested certain definite responsibilities for the Coordination Staff, it would be a mistake to confine the operational latitude of the body to those recommendations. Rather the Staff should be regarded as the full coordination arm of the Director of Central Intelligence and, therefore, having a similar status within and the same relationship to the members of the intelligence community as does the DCI himself. In the absence of this broad point of view there will be constant danger of the Coordination Staff becoming so engrossed in pressing but limited inter-agency matters that it will seldom if ever look at the community as a whole.

Perhaps the most important single function of the Coordination Staff involves the continuing evaluation of whether the community is providing its customers with what they need. This is not a matter of a one-shot survey; on the contrary, it entails a constant awareness of requirements and of assets, with steady attention to the improvement of these assets and to their most effective utilization by the community as a whole. A serious shortcoming of U. S. intelligence in past years has been the unremitting and disjointed proliferation of activity without apparent central concern for the nature and quality of the end product. The questions of collection and production priorities and of the related allocation of resources, from the community-wide point of view and with attention to where the community is heading, will require continuing attention from the Coordination Staff.

Related to the evaluation of community effectiveness is the function of long-range program guidance on a properly coordinated basis. As the Coordination Staff identifies intelligence gaps and uncovers duplication, while reviewing agency plans, programs, and activities, it will naturally acquire knowledge useful for the future guidance of programs in intelligence agencies. The need for central long-term planning for the community, based on full knowledge of current operations and plans, is a natural concern of every DCI and a matter on which a good Coordination Staff can render him great assistance.

Also deserving of special mention as a major function of the Coordination Staff is the bringing of management problems to the attention of the DCI. With every agency busily engaged in operational pursuits, the question of ensuring that the diverse activities, particularly when more than one agency is involved, are efficiently managed is easily overlooked. What is involved here is a clear distinction between control and inertia; intelligence operations frequently become

self-perpetuating, hence the need for management review to ensure purpose, effectiveness, and coordination. The conduct of this function will naturally break down into many separate areas of study, but it is of no less significance therefore.

Finally, as a major function of the Coordination Staff, might be mentioned what is perhaps its most obvious concern, namely, assisting the coordination of specific interagency operational activities on all fronts. These are matters which are most readily apparent and perhaps most amenable to Coordination Staff action. Most of the activities suggested below fall into this category.

Specific tasks. In attempting to identify problem areas which merit attention by the Director of Central Intelligence's new Coordination Staff, it would probably be desirable first to review the 43 recommendations of the Joint Study Group. These recommendations are of varying significance and call for action by diverse components of the intelligence community. In those cases which clearly require action by one or more agencies, it would seem most desirable not to interfere directly with implementational efforts. Regarding other recommendations, however, which call for an interagency approach, and particularly in those cases in which the United States Intelligence Board is specified, it would seem appropriate that the Coordination Staff assume leadership in initiating corrective actions.

Both within and outside of the JSG report, there are several clearly identified areas which are particularly needful of study by the Coordination Staff. Without going into detail on each of them, a list would include the following:

1. USIB Committee structure - as per Recommendation No. 33 of the JSG report.
2. Photographic intelligence - NSC/D No. 8 has already been approved but special attention will be essential to ensure respect for the Presidential directive that no other center should duplicate the functions of the MPIC. Because of the expanding scope of this activity, it deserves continuing surveillance.
3. Mechanical translation. A dozen or so research projects in this field are currently coming to a head and vigorous coordination will be essential to prevent duplication in the selection and production of proven hardware.
4. Current intelligence production. The large number of daily intelligence publications in Washington begs investigation, with the possible goal of producing a single all-source product satisfying the needs of all agencies.

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5. Duplicate processing of overt publications. It appears that many foreign language publications are processed in more than one agency, and attention is needed to determine whether a more rational approach is not developable.

6. Duplicate processing of COMINT and ELINT. In the special intelligence area the service agencies at different echelons and NSA still appear to be duplicating one another.

7. A central requirements register. NSD action assigned the establishment of this register to the USIB but recognized the need for considerable effort under the Secretary of Defense. The Coordination Staff might properly monitor this activity to assure that it does not get bogged down before it gets off the ground.

8. Clandestine training. The establishment of a single U. S. clandestine training facility by CIA was obviously intended by Recommendation No. 13 and every effort should be expended to insure that the various agencies cooperate fully in achieving it.

9. Clandestine operations. These field activities apparently are in need of closer coordination. Initial steps in this field might include submission to the Coordination Staff by the DCI of disrupted operations. In addition, Coordination Staff personnel might actively serve as negotiators or mediators in areas of primary discussion.

10. Security clearances. Due to the acute need of proficient translators, the Coordination Staff might profitably review the security clearance standards currently applicable to foreign-born personnel, as well as the operational situation surrounding these personnel, to determine if the standards might not be relaxed somewhat without jeopardizing our national security.

11. Handling of sensitive information. It is apparent that there are no established criteria commonly applied to the dissemination and handling of sensitive information in different agencies. The problem caused by refusing essential information to need-to-know personnel deserves study.

12. The National Indication Center - as per Recommendation No. 15.

13. The National Intelligence Survey. This encyclopedic program needs review on grounds of scope, timeliness, pertinence and value, in relation to the utilization of limited assets of the agencies concerned.

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14. Plan and program review - as per Recommendation No. 32. This could easily evolve into the most important continuing responsibility of the Coordination Staff. Reviewing procedures should be tackled first.

15. Automatic data processing. Constant attention will be necessary to prevent the duplication of research contracts and to insure the development of compatible systems for the processing of intelligence.

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October 25, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR MESSRS. GRAY and LAY

SUBJECT: Closer Integration of Foreign Intelligence Activities
Within the Department of Defense

1. On October 10, 1960 (following a conversation with the President), Mr. Gray requested an assembly of available material which would have a bearing on the drafting of objectives looking toward the elimination of duplication in foreign intelligence activities conducted within the Department of Defense.

2. The attached Outline summary has been prepared as the basis for initiating the drafting of such objectives, in the light of the following aspects of the problem:

I. General Considerations

- A. Pertinent Statutory Provisions
- B. National Security Council Intelligence Directives
- C. Executive Branch Review of U. S. Foreign Intelligence Activities
 - 1. The President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
 - 2. The Joint Study Group

II. Possible Statement of Objectives

- A. Long-Term Objective
 - 1. Possible Alternative Measures
- B. Short-Term Objective
 - 1. Possible Measure

3. Observation: It appears that the following considerations would determine the nature and timing of a new effort to achieve closer integration and reduction of duplication with respect to foreign intelligence activities conducted within the Department of Defense:

a. Authority and Responsibilities of the DCI

(1) The question as to whether existing statutes provide the DCI with mandatory authority to exercise strong, centralized direction, integration and co-ordination of the intelligence activities of the member agencies of the U. S. intelligence community is at least subject to interpretation. The National Security Act establishes a DCI as head of the CIA, and then goes on to provide that it shall be the duty of CIA to advise the NSC on the intelligence activities of agencies, to recommend to the NSC on the coordination of such activities, and to correlate, evaluate and disseminate intelligence within

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the Government. In setting forth these duties of the CIA, the Act includes a proviso that the other departments and agencies shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence -- a proviso which in effect recognizes that the respective agencies, including the military services, have a need to carry on these intelligence activities for their individual purposes, in addition to national intelligence requirements. (NOTE: Hull Board Recommendation No. 33, on which Presidential action is now pending, suggests that the DCI's views be obtained on the need for new legislation, or revised directives, and also views concerning the advisability of placing the responsibility for coordinating the national intelligence effort on an official who would be divorced from any agency making up the intelligence community.)

(2) The NSCID's referred to in the attached appear to vest a more positive authority in the DCI than does the National Security Act. NSCID No. 1 says that the DCI shall co-ordinate foreign intelligence activities, and charges the USIB with providing coordination, integration and guidance to the agencies, including the intelligence components of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, JCS and NSA, and it is provided that the foreign intelligence agencies shall not duplicate the activities of other agencies in the field of intelligence production. NSCID No. 2 says that the DCI shall ensure that duplication and overlap is avoided in departments and agencies' collection activities. NSCID No. 3 provides that CIA will produce current intelligence primarily to meet the needs of the President and the NSC (but recognizes the prerogative of the various agencies to produce and disseminate intelligence necessary to meet their own internal requirements).

b. Authority of the Secretary of Defense: Under the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, the Secretary of Defense is empowered to take the necessary steps (other than a merger of the Services) to provide for efficient administration and "to eliminate duplication" within Defense.

c. Hull Board Recommendations: Since 1956, the Hull Board has made 8 recommendations at various times (the most recent on 10/4/60) bearing on the need for strong co-ordination by the DCI and the need for eliminating duplication in the various areas of foreign intelligence activities. (See pages 6 through 9 of the attached summary.) These recommendations are in various stages of implementation -- and the two most recent recommendations (No. 33 and No. 34) await presentation to the President for action. Recommendation No. 29 and No. 33 go to the very heart of the effort to achieve strong co-ordination of, and the elimination of duplication in, the foreign intelligence activities of all agencies, particularly those within Defense. Recommendation No. 33 would have the DCI furnish views on the advisability of new legislation and revised directives as the basis for strong central direction and co-ordination.

d. The Joint Study Group: The Joint Study Group (see pages 9-10 of attached) is right now engaged in a survey which holds promise of recommendations for, among other things, eliminating duplication in the foreign intelligence effort. Its report and recommendations to the Principals are due on December 15, 1960.

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e. Possible Statement of Objectives: While it is possible to draft objectives which include certain aspects of the problem (see pages 10-11 of attachment), it would appear that any new effort to achieve integration and the elimination of duplication within the Defense intelligence structure should await the report of the Joint Study Group, and an early response to Hull Board Recommendations No. 29, No. 33 and No. 34. The next step would be an examination within the NSC of possible requirements for new legislation, and/or the revision of pertinent NSCID's, as the basis of NSC recommendations to the President in keeping with the provisions of Sec. 102(d) of the National Security Act.

A. Russell Ash

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10/21/60

OUTLINE

Considerations and Objectives Involved in Achieving Closer Integration of Foreign Intelligence Activities Within the Department of Defense

I - General Considerations

A. Pertinent Statutory Provisions: The National Security Act of 1947, as amended through August 24, 1958, including amendments effected by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, establishes the following responsibilities and authorizations in the area of foreign intelligence:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI):

- a. Shall be the head of the CIA (Sec. 102(a)).
- b. Shall not possess or exercise any supervision or control over the armed services, except that which he possesses or is authorized to exercise as DCI. (Sec. 102(b)(1)(B)).

2. The CIA, "under the direction of the National Security Council", shall have the following duties:

a. Advise the NSC on such intelligence activities of Government agencies as relate to the national security; make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of such intelligence activities; and correlate and evaluate such intelligence for appropriate dissemination within the Government (Sec. 102 (d)(1)(2)(3)).

b. "Provided... that the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence..." (Sec. 102 (d)(3)).

c. The CIA shall also perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may direct (Sec. 102 (d) (5)).

3. Other departments and agencies possessing such intelligence are required to make it available to the DCI "for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security", to the extent recommended by the NSC and approved by the President. (Sec. 102 (e))

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4. The Secretary of Defense:

a. "Within the policy enunciated in section 2, the Secretary of Defense shall take appropriate steps (including the transfer, reassignment, abolition, and consolidation of functions) to provide in the Department of Defense for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and to eliminate duplication..." (Sec. 202 (c)(1)).

b. "Whenever the Secretary of Defense determines it will be advantageous to the Government in terms of effectiveness, economy, or efficiency, he shall provide for the carrying out of any supply or service activity common to more than one military department by a single agency or such other organizational entities as he deems appropriate." (Sec. 202 (c)(6)).

c. Section 2 declares the intent of Congress to provide that each military department shall be separately organized under the direction and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide for their unified direction under the civilian control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge these departments or services; to provide for the establishment of unified or specified commands and a clear and direct line of command to such commands; to eliminate unnecessary duplication in the Department of Defense; to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff nor an over-all armed forces general staff; etc.

5. Establishment of unified and specified commands: "With the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall establish unified or specified combatant commands for the performance of military missions... Such combatant commands are responsible to the President and to the Secretary of Defense for such military missions as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Defense with the approval of the President... Under the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense each military department shall be responsible for the administration of the forces assigned from its department to such combatant commands. The responsibility for the support of forces assigned to combatant commands shall be vested in one or more of the military departments as may be directed by the Secretary of Defense..." (Sec. 202 (j)).

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6. The Military Services: With regard to the Army, Navy and Air Force, respectively, the Act vests each Service with responsibility for the preparation of its forces "necessary for the effective prosecution of war". (Sec. 205(e); Sec. 206(b); Sec. 207(f)).

7. The JCS: "Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall (1) prepare strategic plans and provide for the strategic direction of the armed forces ...(3) establish unified commands in strategic areas..." , etc.

B. National Security Council Intelligence Directives: The following provisions of NSCIDs are pertinent to a consideration of closer integration and elimination of duplication with respect to U.S. foreign intelligence activities conducted within the Defense Department:

1. NSCID No. 1, entitled "Basic Duties and Responsibilities", includes the following provisions:

Par. 1: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of the United States in accordance with the law and NSC directives."

Par. 2: "To maintain the relationship necessary for a fully coordinated intelligence community (which specifically includes the intelligence components of the Departments of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, JCS, and NSA) and to provide for a more effective integration of and guidance to the national intelligence effort, a United States Intelligence Board is hereby established". It is further provided that the USIB shall advise and assist the DCI in carrying out his responsibility for coordinating U.S. foreign intelligence activity. Specifically, the USIB is directed to (1) establish policies and programs for guidance of the intelligence agencies (2) establish intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities, and (3) make recommendations on foreign intelligence matters to appropriate U.S. officials, particularly to the Secretary of Defense on intelligence matters within the jurisdiction of NSA.

Par. 6-2: "In so far as practicable, in the fulfillment of their respective responsibilities for the production of intelligence, the several departments and agencies shall not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of other departments and agencies and shall make full use of existing capabilities of the other elements of the intelligence community."

Par. 3-6: "The Director of Central Intelligence...shall make such surveys of departmental intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies as he may deem necessary in connection with his duty to advise the National Security Council and to coordinate the intelligence effort of the United States".

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2. NSCIB No. 2, entitled "Coordination of Collection Activities", includes the following provisions which are pertinent to the objective of avoiding undesirable duplication:

Par. 1: "The Director of Central Intelligence...shall ensure that planning for the utilization of the collecting and reporting capabilities for intelligence purposes of each of the several departments and agencies avoids undesirable duplication and uncoordinated overlap and provides adequate coverage for national security purposes."

Par. 2: "The Department of State shall have primary responsibility for, and shall perform as a service of common concern, the collection abroad of political, sociological, economic, scientific and technical information."

Par. 3: "The Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force shall have primary responsibility for, and shall perform as a service of common concern, the collection abroad of Army, Naval, and Air intelligence information respectively. Owing to the importance of scientific and technical intelligence to the military services, this collection responsibility shall include scientific and technical, as well as economic information pertinent to departmental missions."

Par. 4: "The Central Intelligence Agency may collect abroad intelligence information in support of assigned functions or as a by-product of assigned functions; Provided, That this collection involves no undesirable duplication of any of the specific assignments in paragraphs 2 or 3, above, and Provided, That any such overt collection is coordinated with the Department of State or with the Senior U.S. Representative".

3. NSCIB No. 3, entitled "Coordination of Intelligence Production", includes the following provisions:

Par. 2-a: "Current intelligence is that intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest which is usually disseminated without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation".

Par. 2-b: "The Central Intelligence Agency and the several departments and agencies shall produce and disseminate such current intelligence as may be necessary to meet their own internal requirements. Normally, the current intelligence produced by the Central Intelligence Agency is produced primarily to meet the needs of the President and National Security Council; in addition, it serves the common needs of the interested departments and agencies for current intelligence which they themselves do not produce..."

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Par. 3: "Departmental intelligence is that intelligence which any department or agency requires to execute its own mission." Having established this definition, the NSCID goes on to provide in Par. 6: "Each department or agency, taking full cognizance of the facilities of the other agencies, shall maintain adequate research facilities to accomplish its departmental intelligence production mission and to provide such additional intelligence within its field of primary responsibilities as may be necessary to satisfy other requirements relating to the national security".

Par. 4: "Interdepartmental intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence which is required by departments and agencies of the Government for the execution of their missions but transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency to produce. Joint Intelligence is a special category of interdepartmental intelligence jointly produced by the Military Departments in the performance of the assigned missions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The subcommittee structure of the U.S. Intelligence Board may be utilized for the production and dissemination of inter-departmental intelligence".

Par. 5: "National intelligence is that intelligence which is required for the formulation of national security policy, concerns more than one department or agency and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency. The production of national intelligence is covered in NSCID No. 1..." (i.e., the DCI is made responsible for disseminating national intelligence to the President, the NSC, the member agencies of USIB, etc).

Par. 7: Allocates production responsibilities for specified categories of intelligence among the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force and CIA. The NSCID then goes on to provide, in Par. 8: "Despite the above mentioned allocations of primary production responsibilities, there will be areas of common or overlapping interest which will require continuing inter-agency liaison and cooperation..." (to be provided by the DCI in consultation with the USIB).

4. NSCID No. 5, on the subject of "U. S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad" places on the DCI the responsibility for coordinating all such activities (except in active theaters of war). The NSCID provides, however, in Par. 4: "...other departments and agencies with commands or installations located outside the U.S. and its possessions may (a) conduct supplementary espionage in order to satisfy departmental intelligence needs (b) conduct clandestine counterintelligence activities necessary for the security of their personnel, commands, activities, and installations..."

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C. Executive Branch Review of U. S. Foreign Intelligence Activities:
In addition to various studies which have been made of the U. S. intelligence structure in past years, there are two survey-type activities under way at the present time which are designed, and are being pursued, for purposes which include the elimination of duplication in the foreign intelligence activities of the Government. These two efforts, one of a continuing nature, the other an ad hoc endeavor are as follows:

1. The President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, which was created by Executive Order in 1956 to conduct an objective review of U. S. foreign intelligence activities and of the performance of the CIA, has submitted to the President a total of 7 reports containing an aggregate of 37 recommendations. Of these recommendations, 8 deal with the related subjects of (1) the exercise by the DCI of a more positive coordination and integration of the national intelligence effort, and (2) the elimination of undesirable duplication within the U.S. intelligence community. The gist of each of these 8 recommendations and the status of implementation as to each, is reflected in the following brief summary:

Recommendation No. 1, Board Report of 12/20/56: THAT THE DCI BE ENCOURAGED TO EXERCISE A MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND POSITIVE COORDINATING RESPONSIBILITY IN DIRECTING THE INTEGRATION OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. Following Presidential approval of this recommendation, the DCI has subsequently reported in March 1960 that he had established the Office of Deputy Director for Coordination; and that the issuance of revised NSCID's in 1958 had clarified his coordinating authority and responsibility.

Recommendation No. 4, Board report of 12/20/56: THAT ACTION BE TAKEN TO EFFECT STRONG, CENTRALIZED DIRECTION (BOTH THROUGH THE NSC AND THE DCI) OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND ITS RESOURCES, IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT AND TO CONTAIN ITS COSTS. The DCI has reported on three occasions over the period 1957-1960, to the effect that this recommendation is being met through the revisions of NSCID's and DCID's, and through CIA studies designed to produce a single daily intelligence bulletin for the intelligence community in lieu of the many bulletins being produced.

Recommendation No. 10, Board report of 12/20/56: THAT, TO RELIEVE THE DCI OF THE MANY MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES HE IS CALLED UPON TO DISCHARGE AS HEAD OF CIA, THE DCI BE PROVIDED WITH A CHIEF OF STAFF OR EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR TO ACT AS HIS "EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT", THEREBY ENABLING HIM TO DIRECT HIS EFFORTS MORE TOWARD THE INTEGRATION, REDUCTION OF DUPLICATION, AND COORDINATION WHICH ARE REQUIRED WITHIN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. In lieu of this recommendation,

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the President approved an alternate DCI recommendation which resulted in the creation of the new post of Deputy Director for Coordination.

Recommendation No. 16, Board report of 10/30/58: THAT THE DCI BE CHARGED WITH SEARCHING OUT AREAS OF DUPLICATION WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. In reporting on the status of this recommendation in March, 1960, the DCI indicated that the principal effort in this regard had been toward a determination of the over-all costs of foreign intelligence activities; and the DCI referred to the creation of a USIB Committee on Cost Estimates in June of 1959.

Recommendation No. 18, Board report of 10/30/58: HERE THE BOARD REITERATED REC. #10, ABOVE, NAMELY THAT THE DCI BE PROVIDED WITH A CHIEF OF STAFF OR EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND IT STATED: "ACTION ON THIS RECOMMENDATION RESULTED IN THE DESIGNATION BY THE DCI OF A DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR COORDINATION. WHILE THIS HAS SERVED GOOD PURPOSES, IT DOES NOT, IN OUR VIEW, MEET THE NEED OF THE DCI FOR THE EXECUTIVE ASSISTANCE WHICH WE STILL BELIEVE HE SHOULD HAVE." A RELATED BOARD RECOMMENDATION CALLED FOR THE EXPANSION OF THE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CIA'S INSPECTOR GENERAL. In reporting on the status of this recommendation in March, 1960, the DCI stated "The DCI has assigned additional responsibilities to the Inspector General and increased his authority in certain specified areas".

Recommendation No. 29, Board report of 5/21/60: THAT THE GROWING EVIDENCE OF UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION OF EFFORT IN THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION, PRODUCTION AND PUBLICATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE DATA CAN BE CORRECTED READILY BY THE EXERCISE OF A GREATER COORDINATION ROLE ON THE PART OF THE DCI AND BY MORE COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEVERAL RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY MADE ON MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE INTEGRATION, COORDINATION AND DIRECTION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE EFFORT -- THE BOARD NOTING A CONTINUING TREND AMONG AGENCIES, PARTICULARLY IN DEFENSE, TO DEVELOP SEPARATE AND DUPLICATIVE CAPABILITIES WHICH SHOULD BE HANDLED ON A JOINT, COMMON-CONCERN BASIS UNDER USIB. Before acting on this recommendation, the President asked for comments from the DCI and from Defense. The DCI said (1) the intelligence agencies are steadily policing the publication of unnecessary intelligence materials (2) an ad hoc Publications Committee of USIB has furnished two study reports to USIB and is studying the feasibility of a single daily intelligence periodical for Washington users (3) USIB committees have furthered the coordination of COMINT and ELINT activities (4) a USIB committee has contributed to the elimination of duplication in

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the area of Clandestine Collection, and (5) the DCI hopes that duplication will be further eliminated through the efforts of the Joint Study Group (hereinafter described). Defense advised that (1) steps have been taken by NSA to establish standards for ELINT operations (2) USAF has reviewed its clandestine collection efforts and has referred some to CIA (3) Army has discontinued its weekly intelligence digest and daily bulletin, and (4) Army has instituted controls to reduce duplication of production and collection requirements. On 10/6/60, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs informed the Board of the President's desire that more rapid progress be made in this matter and that he was looking to the work of the Joint Study Group to assist in achieving the objectives of the recommendation.

Recommendation No. 33, Board report of 10/4/60: WE SUGGEST THAT THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE YOU AND THE BOARD WITH HIS VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO: (A) THE MEASURES (LEGISLATIVE AND/OR EXECUTIVE) WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED TO INSURE STRONG CENTRALIZED DIRECTION, CO-ORDINATION AND INTEGRATION OF ALL U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; (B) WHETHER LONG-TERM, NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS WILL BEST BE SERVED BY CONTINUING TO VEST IN ONE OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CO-ORDINATING ALL MEMBER AGENCIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TOGETHER WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADMINISTERING AN OPERATING AGENCY WHICH IS A COMPONENT AND COMPETING ELEMENT OF THAT COMMUNITY. In making this recommendation, the Board expressed the belief that integration, coordination, and strong established direction of the national intelligence effort have not been achieved in the measure authorized by the National Security Act and NSCID's. The Board expressed serious reservations as to whether these objectives will be achieved so long as the authority of the DCI to coordinate U.S. foreign intelligence activities is interpreted as being permissive rather than mandatory. (As of 10/18/60 this recommendation awaited presentation to the President for a decision as to approval of it).

Recommendation No. 34, Board report of 10/4/60: WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU DIRECT THE HEADS OF THE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES CONCERNED TO INITIATE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO ELIMINATE: (A) UNNECESSARY INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS; (B) UNDESIRABLE DUPLICATION IN THE PUBLICATIONS WHICH ARE RETAINED; AND (C) UNNECESSARY USE OF PERSONNEL AND FUNDS IN PREPARING, PRINTING, REPRODUCING AND DISTRIBUTING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS AND RELATED ISSUANCES. Here the Board is singling out one area of duplication for proposed immediate action, that is,

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the duplication of intelligence publications. The Board notes with approval the USIB studies which were undertaken at the earlier instigation of the Board, but feels that regardless of the outcome of the USIB studies the DCI should act at once to call on agency heads to take the recommended steps with regard to unnecessary and duplicative publications. (As of 10/18/60, this recommendation awaited presentation to the President for decision as to approval of it).

2. The Joint Study Group, whose terms of reference were approved in July, 1960, was organized on an ad hoc basis "to promote the most effective and efficient use of intelligence resources and to assist the DCI in carrying out his responsibilities for coordinating the foreign intelligence activities of the U.S. Government." The Group was organized by agreement of the DCI (who provided a Chairman), the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs -- and an observer was provided by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. Under its charter, the Group is studying all aspects of foreign intelligence, with its attention primarily concentrated on organizational and management aspects of 5 specified areas within the broad field of intelligence effort. Three of the areas to which the Group is directing its attention as called for in its terms of reference are as follows:

"2-a. Inter-departmental, departmental, agency and military service procedures for handling of intelligence requirements and related guidance to collectors -- with particular attention to: (1) Procedures for keeping down the volume of, and avoiding unprofitable duplication in, such guidance...(2) Inter-departmental arrangements for selective levying of requirements on the most appropriate collection facility or facilities.

"2-c. The present military intelligence coordinating machinery and its relationship to the intelligence community -- with particular attention to possibilities for closer integration under the authority of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.

2-d. The effectiveness of current implementation of intelligence coordination directives and procedures -- with special attention to the field coordination of overseas intelligence activities, and to community support for the intelligence needs of senior US representatives abroad, including military commanders."

The Group has received briefings by elements of the member agencies of the intelligence community; has visited intelligence processing centers in the U.S.; has held discussions with knowledgeable persons in the intelligence field; has followed up with a study of selected areas;

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and the Group went to Europe the first week in October for on-the-spot examinations of the activities of various intelligence agencies.

(NOTE: In a briefing of the Group by a Joint Staff representative, it was stated that the Secretary of Defense has requested that the JCS conduct a review of the military intelligence requirements of all elements of the Department of Defense -- a review which has not yet been completed.) The Group has indicated the belief that it can make some helpful recommendations for improvement, including greater integration of intelligence activities and the elimination of unnecessary duplication. Under its terms of reference, the Group will present by December 15, 1960, its findings and recommendations to the DCI for consideration by the Principals. The President's Board of Consultants (Hull Board) will be given an opportunity to comment on the report. The Study Group's terms of reference finally provide:

"Any actions to implement approved recommendations shall be the exclusive responsibility of the heads of the departments or agencies directly concerned".

II - Possible Statement of Objectives

A. Long-term Objective: The elimination of unnecessary duplication of effort in the collection, analysis, interpretation, production and publication of foreign intelligence by the member agencies of the U.S. intelligence community. (This proposed "objectives" language is taken from the aptly-phrased recommendation on the subject of "Duplication" in the Hull Board's Sixth Report, dated 5/24/60).

1. Possible Alternative Measures

a. Seek new legislation which would specifically vest the DCI with mandatory responsibility and authority for coordination and integration of the foreign intelligence activities of all U.S. agencies, including those within the Department of Defense.

b. Seek new legislation to vest coordinating and integrating responsibility over the intelligence community in an official who is divorced from any of the competing member agencies of the community.

c. Without seeking new legislation, and based on the present provisions of the National Security Act as amended by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, issue revised NSCID's which would (1) translate the over-all authority and responsibility of the Secretary of Defense, as provided in the Defense Reorganization Act, into a statement of responsibility for coordinating and integrating the foreign intelligence activities of the Services with a view to eliminating unnecessary duplication therein, and (2) vest the DCI with mandatory authority and responsibility to integrate and coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of the member agencies of the intelligence community, including those within Defense.

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(NOTE: The above "alternatives" are suggested in part by Recommendation No. 33 of the Hull Board, in its report dated 10/4/60 -- which Recommendation has not yet been approved by the President for referral to the DCI).

B. Short-Term Objectives: The taking of immediate action, through the DCI, by all member agencies of the intelligence community to eliminate unnecessary and duplicative intelligence publications.

1. Possible Measure: A Presidential directive to the agency heads, through the DCI, to take the required measures. (NOTE: This is the gist of Recommendation 34 of the Hull Board, in its report of 10/4/60 which Recommendation has not been approved by the President for referral to the DCI).

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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.**

29 JUN 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James Lay
300 Executive Office Building

SUBJECT : Outstanding DCIDs

Enclosed herewith is a set of the currently outstanding Director of Central Intelligence Directives and a listing in summary form of those provisions in the NSCIDs which deal with the "management" responsibilities of the DCI and the USIB.

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/ Secretary
Joint Study Group

Enc.: a/s (32) & (1) Working Paper
DCIDs 1/1-1/6, 1/9, 1/11, 2/1-2/6
3/1, 3/3-3/5, 4/1-4/3, 5/1-5/5
6/2, 6/20-6/22, 7/1, 11/2
29 June 1960 re: Management Responsibilities
of the DCI and the USIB

*Returned
to OCB - 6 Apr. 61*

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WORKING PAPER

29 June 1960

SUBJECT: Management Responsibilities of the DCI and the USIB

It is believed that the following (summarized) provisions of the NSCIDs would be of interest to the Study Group as they cover the "management" responsibilities of the DCI and the USIB, and the community responsibilities of the departments and agencies. The summaries do not include the varying types of qualifying phrases that are to be found in the full text of these provisions, i.e., "within the limit of their capabilities," etc.

NSCID No. 1 -- Basic Duties and Responsibilities

(Foreword:) The intelligence effort of the United States is a national responsibility and must be so organized and managed as to exploit to the maximum the available resources of the Government and to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the NSC and of the departments and agencies of the Government.

(Para. 1:) The DCI shall coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of the US in accordance with existing law and applicable National Security Council directives.

(Para. 2.a.): To provide for a more effective integration of and guidance to the national intelligence effort, a USIB is hereby established.

The Board shall advise and assist the DCI and shall also:

1. Establish policies and develop programs for the guidance of all departments and agencies concerned.

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2. Establish appropriate intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities.

3. Review and report to the NSC on the foreign-intelligence effort as a whole.

4. Make recommendations on foreign-intelligence matters to appropriate US officials.

(Para. 2.f.): NSCIDs shall, as applicable, be promulgated and implemented by the departments and agencies of the Government.

(Para. 2.g.): Decisions of the USIB shall be binding, as applicable, on all departments and agencies of the Government.

(Para. 3.a.): DCIDs shall, as applicable, be promulgated and implemented within the normal command channels of the departments and agencies concerned.

(Para. 3.b.): DCIDs shall include:

1. General guidance and the establishment of specific priorities for the production of national and other intelligence and for collection and other activities in support thereof.

2. Establishment of policy, procedures and practices for the maintenance within the community of a continuing interchange of intelligence and intelligence information.

3. Establishment of policy, procedures and practices for the production or procurement by the individual components of the community within the limits of their capability of such intelligence and intelligence information as may be requested by one of the departments or agencies.

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(Para. 3.c.:) The DCI shall make such surveys of the departmental intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies as he may deem necessary.

(Para. 6.a.:) The DCI in consultation with and supported by the other members of the USIB shall:

1. Ensure that on intelligence matters affecting the national security, the intelligence community is supported by the full knowledge and technical talent available in or to the Government.
2. Ensure that the pertinence, extent and quality of the available foreign intelligence and intelligence information relating to the national security is continually reviewed as a basis for improving the quality of intelligence and for the correction of deficiencies.
3. Take appropriate measures to facilitate the coordinated development of compatible referencing systems within the departments and agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities.
4. To facilitate the performance of their respective intelligence missions, the departments and agencies concerned shall, by agreement, provide each other with such mutual assistance as may be within their capabilities and as may be required in the interests of the intelligence community for reasons of economy, efficiency or operational necessity.

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(Para. 6.b.:) Insofar as practicable, the several departments and agencies shall not duplicate the intelligence (production) activities and research of other departments and agencies.

NSCID No. 2 -- Coordination of Collection Activities

(Para. 1:) The DCI, in consultation with the USIB, shall ensure that planning for the utilization of the collecting and reporting capabilities for intelligence purposes of each of the several departments and agencies avoids undesirable duplication and uncoordinated overlap.

(Para. 10:) Departments and agencies carrying out the collection activities mentioned (in this directive) shall recognize, in establishing collection programs, the needs of the other departments and agencies.

NSCID No. 3 -- Coordination of Intelligence Production

(Para. 6:) Each department or agency, taking full cognizance of the facilities of the other agencies, shall maintain adequate research facilities to accomplish its departmental intelligence production mission and to provide such additional intelligence within its field of primary responsibility as may be necessary to satisfy other requirements relating to the national security.

(Para. 7:) The established division of interests with respect to the production of intelligence of common concern is subject to refinement through a continuing program of coordination and evaluation by the DCI to promote an integration of effort and avoid undesirable duplication.

(Para. 8:) If a requirement for intelligence is established for which there is no existing production capability, the DCI, in consultation

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with the USIB, shall determine which of the departments and agencies of the intelligence community can best undertake the primary responsibility as a service of common concern.

NSCID No. 5 -- US Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad

(Para. 2:) To ensure centralized direction through prior, comprehensive and continuing coordination of all clandestine activities authorized herein, the DCI shall:

1. Establish, in consultation with the USIB, the procedures necessary to achieve such direction and coordination.

2. Coordinate all clandestine activities.

(Para. 9:) The DCI, in consultation with the USIB and other interested departments and agencies shall:

1. Develop appropriate policy recommendations for NSC consideration with respect to the over-all US counterintelligence effort conducted outside the US and its possessions.

2. To the extent necessary to ensure conformity with policies approved by the NSC, provide for the coordination of all types of US counterintelligence activities conducted abroad.

NOTE: These "management type" responsibilities are, in many cases, repeated in the DCIDs.

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Nº 32

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/2

COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

(Revised 15 September 1958)

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/3

PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

(Revised 24 May 1960)

*Issued by
The Director of Central Intelligence,
with the concurrence of the United
States Intelligence Board, pursuant
to National Security Council Direc-
tive No. 1.*

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W A R N I N G

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/2

COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

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DCID No. 1/2
(New Series)

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/2¹

COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

(Revised 15 September 1958)

1. Pursuant to NSCID No. 1, paragraph 3, the following comprehensive national intelligence objectives, generally applicable to all foreign countries and areas, are hereby established:

- a. Basic descriptive data as outlined in NIS Standard Instructions.
- b. Social, economic, and political stability and trends of development; susceptibility to foreign influence or coercion; vulnerability to subversion.
- c. Military capabilities and vulnerabilities, offensive and defensive, including economic, scientific and technical, and psychological factors.
- d. Capabilities to influence, coerce, or subvert other governments and peoples; capabilities for espionage, sabotage, and other clandestine operations in other countries.
- e. Foreign policy, including strategic concepts and intentions; international alignment, with particular reference to alignment with or against the US or the USSR; disposition and intention to interfere in the internal affairs of other states; preparation for and intention to resort to armed action against other states.

2. Priority national intelligence objectives, with reference to specific countries and subjects, will be set forth in a separate DCID.

3. DCID 1/2, "Comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives," 21 April 1958, is hereby rescinded.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence

¹ This Directive supersedes DCID No. 1/2 of 21 April 1958.

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/3

PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

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DCID No. 1/3
(New Series)

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/3¹

PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

(Revised 24 May 1960)

1. Pursuant to NSCID No. 1, paragraph 3, the following list of priority national intelligence objectives is established as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national security policy. This list replaces that contained in DCID 1/3, 30 September 1958, which is hereby rescinded.

2. In accordance with the criteria set forth in the Annex, all items in this listing are deemed to be critical national intelligence factors requiring priority attention and effort. Distinction is made, however, between three levels of priority within the general priority category. Order of listing within these three groups is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within the group.

3. Although a given subject may be listed as a matter of priority, not every bit of information relating to it will be required with equal urgency and some may be procurable by routine means. It is therefore incumbent upon research personnel to exercise discrimination in allocating analytical resources and in formulating information requirements so as to accord priority only to those aspects of the listed subject which actually require a priority research or collection effort. Similarly, if specific collection and analytic facilities are inadequate to satisfy all the requirements levied upon them, a determination of priority in their use will have to be made, under the general guidance of the PNIO's but in terms of specific operational capabilities.

4. In order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planning, this directive is designed to remain valid over an extended period. It will be reviewed annually, or on the request of any member of the United States Intelligence Board. It is recognized that urgent interim requirements may arise requiring ad hoc treatment.

¹ This revised Directive is a re-issuance of DCID No. 1/3 of 15 December 1959 (which had superseded DCID No. 1/3, dated 30 September 1958), deleting references to Annexes B through F, in accordance with the USIB decision of 24 May 1960 to discontinue publication of Annexes other than the Annex on "Criteria for Determining Priority National Intelligence Objectives."

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I. FIRST CATEGORY

a. Maximum prior warning of impending Soviet, Chinese Communist, or Satellite attack on the United States, on US forces overseas, or on any country which the United States is committed to defend.

b. Present and future Soviet capabilities and plans for nuclear attack on the US or on US nuclear retaliatory forces by any weapons delivery system, or by clandestine means.

c. Soviet over-all political and military strategy, intentions, and plans with respect to initiating hostilities, particularly using Soviet or Satellite armed forces.

d. Chinese Communist over-all political and military strategy, intentions, and plans with respect to initiating hostilities, particularly using Chinese Communist or other Far Eastern Communist armed forces.

e. Present and future Soviet capabilities for defense against nuclear attack by aircraft and missiles.

f. The identification and precise geodetic location of critical air and missile targets in the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

g. Soviet activities in and relating to space which contribute significantly to, or are indicative of, Soviet military capabilities.

II. SECOND CATEGORY

The USSR and European Satellites

a. The Soviet estimate of US and allied capabilities and intentions, of US and allied economic and political stability, and of the strength, cohesion, and probable development of NATO.

b. Major Soviet international political objectives and courses of action, including economic policies and actions, with particular reference to courses designed to orient non-Bloc countries toward the Soviet Bloc, to weaken and disrupt US and US-supported alliances, or to foment antagonism among the Western Powers and between these powers and the rest of the Free World.

c. Soviet and European Satellite political strengths and weaknesses; actual or potential personal or policy conflicts within the ruling groups; Soviet-Satellite relations, with particular reference to the character and degree of Soviet control; the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the Soviet and Satellite populations.

d. The strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet economy, the nature of economic development programs, and their effect upon the economic, political, and military strength of the USSR; the strengths and weaknesses of the Satellite economies insofar as they substantially affect Satellite internal stability or Soviet capabilities.

e. Soviet scientific and technical strengths and weaknesses substantially affecting Soviet military, economic, and political capabilities; So-

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viet exploitation of space for scientific and psychological purposes; Satellite scientific and technical strengths and weaknesses insofar as they substantially affect the pertinent Soviet capabilities.

f. Soviet capabilities and intentions for the development and production of biological and chemical weapons, and for their delivery against the US or key US overseas installations; Satellite developments in this field insofar as they substantially affect pertinent Soviet capabilities.

g. Major developments in the composition and capabilities of the Soviet armed forces; developments in the Satellite armed forces insofar as they substantially affect Soviet military capabilities.

Asia

h. The Chinese Communist estimate of US capabilities and intentions with respect to the Chinese Communist regime and to the situation in Asia.

i. Major Chinese Communist international political objectives and courses of action, with particular reference to courses designed to foment antagonism between Western and Asian powers, and to extend the area of Communist influence and control in Asia.

j. The internal political strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist regime; actual or potential personal or policy conflicts within the ruling group; the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist apparatus of police control; the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the population of mainland China.

k. Sino-Soviet relations, especially the role and influence of the USSR in Chinese Communist policies and courses of action, the role and influence of China in Bloc policies and courses of action, actual or potential strains on Sino-Soviet relations, and the process of joint policy determination.

l. The strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist economy; plans for its development, and progress therein; scientific and technological strengths and weaknesses substantially affecting economic and military capabilities.

m. Major developments in the composition and capabilities of the Chinese Communist armed forces, with particular reference to the possibility of their acquiring nuclear or missile capabilities.

The Middle East

n. The stability and policies of the UAR and Iraq; the growth of Soviet influence in the Middle East; the security of Western access to the petroleum resources of the area; and the possibility of Arab-Israeli or other intra-area hostilities.

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Europe

o. The strength, cohesion, and vitality of the NATO Alliance, including the will and ability of its European members to carry out their commitments; the reactions of governments and peoples in Western Europe, particularly in the UK, France, Italy, and West Germany, to Soviet moves to relax or heighten international tensions and to increasing Soviet nuclear and missile capabilities; their reactions to developments outside the NATO area which affect the global balance of power.



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General

r. Non-Bloc nuclear energy research and development, production of fissionable materials, and use of such materials for weapons and other purposes; non-Bloc development of guided missiles and other advanced weapon systems.

s. The stability of US base rights overseas; threats to the security of US military bases and installations in foreign areas.

t. Sino-Soviet Bloc organizations, plans, activities, and capabilities to effect espionage and sabotage against the US from abroad, against US installations and activities overseas, and against non-Bloc countries; the strength, composition, interrelationships, capabilities (political, subversive, and clandestine), vulnerabilities, and tactics of Communist parties and groups outside the Soviet Bloc and of international Communist front organizations.

III. THIRD CATEGORY

The Far East

a. The military, political, and economic strengths and weaknesses of the North Korean regime; its political and military objectives, capabilities, and intentions; and the relative degree of Soviet and Chinese Communist influence and control.

b. ROK political and economic stability; ROK objectives and intentions toward North Korea, Japan, and the US.

c. The stability and orientation of Japan, with particular reference to its attitudes toward and relations with the US, Communist China, the USSR, and Southeast Asia.

d. Political and economic stability of the Chinese Nationalist regime, with particular reference to its objectives and intentions toward Communist China and its ability to resist Communist pressures and inducements.

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Southeast Asia

e. The political and economic strengths and weaknesses and the general military capabilities of the Viet Minh regime; the nature of its relationships with the USSR and with Communist China; its political and military objectives and intentions; and its capabilities and intentions for clandestine and subversive activity in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

f. The stability of the governments of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Singapore, and Indonesia; reactions of these countries to Communist China's developing power position and to the general threat of further Communist aggrandizement in the region; Communist political and subversive capabilities in these countries and their vulnerability to Bloc political and economic inducements.

South Asia

g. The stability, cohesion, orientation, and military capabilities of India, with particular reference to its position in the global balance of power; its relations with Communist China and the USSR; its attitude and intentions toward developments in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa; and the problems and progress of economic development.

h. The political and economic stability and orientation of Iran and Afghanistan, with particular reference to Communist penetration and influence in these countries.

Europe

i. European integration: progress in implementation of existing projects; new projects proposed; policies, objectives, and motivations of participating countries.

Africa

j. The stability and orientation of independent African states, with particular reference to their vulnerability to Communist influence.

Latin America

k. Political disturbances and social unrest affecting the stability of the governments of the Caribbean area, with particular reference to the stability, internal policy, and international activities of the Castro regime in Cuba.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence

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ANNEX

CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. Priority National Intelligence Objectives should be directly related to the intelligence required in the formulation and execution of national security policy. They should flow directly from the intelligence mission as set forth by the NSC and are therefore merely more detailed specifications of the intelligence required to fulfill that mission. They should provide the basis for determining appropriate research and collection requirements.

2. Most of the intelligence required in the formulation and execution of national security policy will be the product of normal intelligence collection and research. Priority National Intelligence Objectives should be limited to those critical factors which require special attention and effort.

3. In order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planning, a statement of Priority National Intelligence Objectives should be designed to remain valid over an extended period. It should therefore exclude topics of urgent, but transitory, interest, which will require and receive ad hoc treatment in any case.

4. Broad generalities are of little practical use as priority guidance to collection and research. Priority National Intelligence Objectives should therefore be specific enough to provide guidance for planning the allocation of collection and research resources, but not so specific as to constitute in themselves research and collection requirements.

5. Although all items in a statement of Priority National Intelligence Objectives should be worthy of special attention, it is obvious that some will be of greater urgency or importance than others. Any listing of such objectives must be based on an analysis of the world situation and US security interests and should be reviewed annually.

The following criteria will serve as guidance for determining the relative importance of Priority National Intelligence Objectives:

- I. First Category: those which will permit the US (a) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the US; and (b) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion greatest benefit to the US.
- II. Second Category: those which will permit the US (a) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have serious consequences for the US; and (b) to stim-

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ulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion great benefit to the US.

- III. Third Category: those which will permit the US (a) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have harmful consequences to the US; and (b) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion substantial benefits to the US.

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USIB-D-27. 1/9
1 June 1960

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Committees of the USIB

and their Terms of Reference

1. The attached revised listing of both the standing committees and the ad hoc committees or working groups of the United States Intelligence Board is forwarded for information.

2. It is requested that any changes or amendments to this list be submitted to the USIB Secretariat, Code 163, Ext. 3402.

[Redacted Signature Box]

JOHN HEIRES
Executive Secretary

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Attachment

Loggia
"Ext. Survey"

USIB-D-27.1/9
1 June 1960

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

COMMITTEES OF THE USIB

1. Committee on Communications Intelligence -- DCID No. 6/1

Chairman	Mr. T. Achilles Polyzoides	Code 182	
	7812 New State/E	Ext. 5405	25X1
	Department of State		
Executive	[Redacted]		25X1
Secretary	2075 Q Building	[Redacted]	
	CIA		
2. Committee on Critical Communications -- DCID No. 7/1, Para. 11

Chairman	[Redacted]		25X1
	354 Administration Building	Ext. [Redacted]	25X1
	CIA		
3. Committee on Documentation -- DCID No. 1/4

Chairman	Mr. Paul A. Borel	Code 163	
	1053 M Building	Ext. [Redacted]	25X1
	CIA		
Secretary	[Redacted]		25X1
	1053 M Building	Ext. [Redacted]	25X1
	CIA		
4. Committee on Exchanges -- DCID No. 2/6

Chairman	[Redacted]		25X1
	354 Administration Building	Ext. [Redacted]	25X1
	CIA		
Secretary	[Redacted]		25X1
	433 - 1717 H Street, N. W.	Ext. [Redacted]	25X1
	CIA		

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USIB-D-27.1/9
1 June 1960

5. Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications -- DCID No. 2/4, para. 3

Chairman Mr. John Bagnall

Code

Ext.

CIA

25X1

25X1

Secretary

CIA

6. Committee on International Communism -- See Tab A

Chairman Mr. William A. Crawford
7417B New State/E
Department of State

Code 182
Ext. 4545

Executive Secretary Mr. Bernard Morris
7430 New State/E
Department of State

Code 182
Ext. 5426

7. Committee on Procurement of Foreign Publications -- DCID No. 2/5, para. 3

Chairman
1053 M Building
CIA

Ext.

25X1
25X1

Secretary
1029 M Building
CIA

Ext.

25X1
25X1

8. Cost Estimates Committee -- See Tab B

Chairman Mr. Edward Saunders
1039 Alcott Hall
CIA

Code
Ext.

25X1

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USIB-D-27. 1/9

1 June 1960

9. Critical Collection Problems Committee

-- DCID No. 2/2

Chairman	Mr. Robert Amory, Jr. 354 Administration Building CIA	Code <input type="text"/> Ext. <input type="text"/>	25X1 25X1 25X1
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Secretary	<input type="text"/> 2706 L Building CIA	Ext. <input type="text"/>	
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10. Domestic Exploitation Committee

-- DCID No. 2/3, para. 6

Chairman	Mr. E. M. Ashcraft, II 433 - 1717 H Street, N. W. CIA	Code <input type="text"/> Ext. <input type="text"/>	25X1 25X1
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Secretary	<input type="text"/> 433 - 1717 H Street, N. W. CIA	Ext. <input type="text"/>	25X1
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11. Economic Intelligence Committee

-- DCID No. 3/1, especially
para. 3, ff.

Chairman	Dr. Otto E. Guthe 1113 M Building CIA	Code <input type="text"/> Ext. <input type="text"/>	25X1
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Vice Chairman	<input type="text"/> 1113 M Building CIA	Ext. <input type="text"/>	25X1 25X1
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Executive Secretary	<input type="text"/> 1217 M Building CIA	Ext. <input type="text"/>	25X1 25X1
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USIB-D-27. 1/9

1 June 1960

12. Electronics Intelligence Committee

-- DCID No. 6/2

Chairman Mr. Madison E. Mitchell
Room 3E 1085
The Pentagon

Code 11
Ext. 57181

25X1
25X1

Executive
Secretary

2075 Q Building
CIA

Ext.

13. Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

-- DCID No. 3/4 ,
para. 3, ff.

Chairman Colonel Earl McFarland, Jr., USAF Code 11
Room 2A 270
The Pentagon

Ext. 71770

Secretary Mr. John Marshall
Room 2A 270
The Pentagon

Code 11
Ext. 71770 + 54796

14. Interagency Defector Committee

-- DCID No. 4/1

Chairman

1306 K Building
CIA

Ext.

25X1
25X1

Secretary

1306 K Building
CIA

Ext.

25X1
25X1

15. Interagency Priorities Committee

-- DCID No. 5/5

Chairman

1067 L Building
CIA

Code
Ext.

25X1
25X1

Secretary

2706 L Building
CIA

Code
Ext.

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USIB-D-27.1/9
1 June 1960

16. Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee -- DCID No. 3/3, para. 3, ff.

Chairman	Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr. 145 Barton Hall CIA	Code <input type="text"/> Ext. <input type="text"/>	25X1
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Alt. Chairman	<input type="text"/> 1805 Barton Hall CIA	Code <input type="text"/> Ext. <input type="text"/>	25X1
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Secretary	<input type="text"/> 188 Barton Hall CIA	Code <input type="text"/> Ext. <input type="text"/>	25X1
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17. National Intelligence Survey Committee -- See Tab C

Chairman	<input type="text"/> CIA	25X1
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Vice Chairman	<input type="text"/> CIA	25X1
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18. Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee -- See Tab D

Chairman	Colonel Lowell E. May, USAF AFCIN 209 Pentagon Annex # 3	Code 11 Ext. 77723
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Secretary	Major William Biely AFCIN 201 Pentagon Annex #3	Code 11 Ext. 78524
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USIB-D-27. 1/9

1 June 1960

19. Scientific Intelligence Committee

-- DCID No. 3/5 , para. 3, ff.

25X1

Chairman

[Redacted]
145 Barton Hall
CIA

Code

Ext.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Deputy

Chairman

[Redacted]
2505 Barton Hall
CIA

Code

Ext.

[Redacted]

25X1

Executive
Secretary

Dr. [Redacted]
264 Barton Hall
CIA

Code

Ext.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

20. Security Committee

-- DCID No. 1/11

25X1

Chairman

[Redacted]
2058 I Building
CIA

Code

Ext.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Secretary

[Redacted]
Room A-222
CIA

21. Space Surveillance Intelligence Support Committee

-- See Tab E

Chairman

Colonel Lowell E. May, USAF
AFCIN
209 Pentagon Annex #3

Code 11

Ext. 77723

Secretary

Captain Chas. B. Copas, USAF
AFCIN
204 Pentagon Annex #3

Code 11

Ext. 77908

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USIB-D-27.1/9
1 June 1960

22. Watch Committee

-- DCID No. 1/5
(currently under revision)

Chairman General C. P. Cabell, USAF
203 Administration Building
CIA

Code
Ext.

25X1

25X1 Director,
NIC

Code
Ext.

25X1

23. Ad Hoc Group for ELINT (AGE)

-- See Tab F

25X1 Chairman

429 1717 H Street
CIA

24. Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC)

-- See Tab G

25X1 Chairman

429 1717 H Street
CIA

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Tab A

Terms of Reference

Committee on International Communism

From: USIB-D-48.3/2
17 February 1960

1. The name of the Committee will be changed back to its original name "Committee on International Communism" (CC)
2. Membership on the Committee will be drawn from the USIB agencies. Non-USIB agencies may be invited to participate in the work of the Committee as required. The Committee shall work in close cooperation with the CIA Senior Research Staff on International Communism (SRS), and a representative from that Staff shall be a regular member of the Committee in addition to the permanent member from CIA.
3. The Committee will be concerned with national and agency requirements, the extent and adequacy of community research and analysis, and means of reinforcing national and agency efforts in the field of international communism. The Committee will also consider problems arising within the intelligence community in this field, such as the exchange of information on reports published, planned, or in progress; and coordination where necessary of intelligence collection requirements.
4. The Committee will arrange to brief itself on substantive developments in the field of international communism, creating whatever ad hoc working groups it deems desirable.
5. The Committee will make such reports to the USIB as it considers desirable with regard to the status and adequacy of intelligence research, collection requirements, and the existing priority mechanism within the intelligence community.

* * * * *

The above approved by USIB on 1 March 1960 by USIB-M-85, para. 9:
"Including....broadening in the scope of its activities."

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Tab B

Terms of Reference

Cost Estimates Committee

This Committee was established by USIB action on 23 June 1959 in accordance with the following extract from USIB-M-45:

"The Board noted the report by the working group and agreed to establish a standing 'Cost Estimates Committee' of the Board, as recommended, under the chairmanship of Mr. Saunders of CIA and with such other representatives as the Board members designated. It was also agreed that this Committee should compile an estimated foreign intelligence cost report for Fiscal Year 1959 and each year thereafter after the close of the fiscal year in accordance with Tab A to the Working Group's paper, as well as any special cost data reports which the Board may require. The Committee likewise was authorized to adjust the format and content of subsequent reports if it was found necessary to do so. In this connection, it was understood that the completed report for Fiscal Year 1959 would be submitted later to the members for review, at which time the Board would determine questions such as its final contents and format, and the extent of its distribution."

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Tab C

Terms of Reference

National Intelligence Survey Committee

From: NIS Standard Instructions, page 3, para. 2, of "Summary of Agency Functions."

NIS COMMITTEE

The NIS Committee consists of representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chiefs of the Intelligence Agencies of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. The representative of the Director of Central Intelligence is the chairman of the Committee. It may include an advisory member from the Joint Staff who is familiar with the basic intelligence requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and who shall keep the JCS informed of the progress of the NIS Program, and advise the NIS Committee of changes in the JCS requirements.

The NIS Committee performs the following functions:

Considers and approves policies and plans for the NIS Program.

Determines the scope and treatment of each NIS to be produced.

Allocates responsibility for production and maintenance of NIS in accordance with the mission, production capability, and primary interest of the agencies concerned.

Establishes NIS production and maintenance schedules based upon JCS priorities and agency capabilities.

Promulgates procedures and instructions for the preparation, review, editing, and submission of NIS contributions.

Recommends to CIA measures necessary for the coordination of the NIS Program.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The Central Intelligence Agency performs the following functions:

Furnishes the chairman, vice chairman, and secretariat of the NIS Committee.

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Tab C (Cont'd.)

Provides over-all coordination of the NIS Program.

Produces and maintains the NIS units which have been allocated by the NIS Committee as production responsibilities.

Furnished certain common services which can best be done centrally.

Provides advisory substantive review and over-all editorial guidance; processes and publishes the NIS.

Disseminates NIS in accordance with Intelligence Agency agreements.

OTHER USIB AGENCIES

Other USIB Agencies (State, Army, Navy, and Air Force) perform the following functions:

Provide emembers and alternate members of the NIS Committee. Each member represents, and speaks for, the Chief of the Intelligence Agency of the department from which he is accredited.

Produce and maintain the NIS units which have been allocated by the NIS Committee as production responsibilities.

Implement collection efforts required for NIS production and maintenance.

NON-USIB AGENCIES

Contributing non-USIB Agencies perform the following functions:

Produce and maintain portions of NIS when explicitly assigned that responsibility by the NIS Committee or by an Intelligence Agency with the approval of that committee.

Furnish Intelligence Agencies with material for integration into NIS by those agencies.

* * * * *

The NIS Standard Instructions were originally approved by the NSC on 28 December 1948, and issued as provided for in NSCID No. 3 of 13 January 1948, revised 15 September 1958. These original NIS Standard Instructions provided that subsequent changes might be made by the NIS Committee. In effect, therefore, the NIS Committee is empowered to modify its own terms of reference. In practice any disagreement in this Committee is referred to the USIB by resolution -- but this happens very seldom.

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Tab D

Terms of Reference

Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee

1. Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 2 dated 15 September 1959, and USIB memorandum dated 31 March 1959, a Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee (SIRC) of the USIB is hereby established by the Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrence of the USIB. The Committee will concern itself with satellite intelligence requirements involving certain problems specifically referred to it by the USIB or members. In dealing with satellite intelligence requirements problems, the Committee is charged with the following responsibilities:

a. Develop a plan for compiling, establishing priorities, and coordinating satellite intelligence collection requirements.

b. Establish procedures and plans to investigate, study and make recommendations to appropriate authority on questions pertaining to satellite intelligence collection requirements.

c. Provide guidance for dissemination of intelligence derived from U.S. satellite vehicles to meet the varied needs of user agencies, departments and commands.

2. To discharge these responsibilities, SIRC is authorized direct access to persons responsible for satellite intelligence collection requirements and other collection coordination committees of the various agencies and departments of the U.S. Government.

3. The SIRC will be composed of a representative of each USIB member organization (as desired), one of whom will be designated as Chairman by the DCI after consultation with the USIB.

4. The SIRC will meet, as determined by the Committee Chairman, and on special occasions when requested by one or more of its principal members.

* * * * *

The above terms of reference have been informally agreed by the Committee members as outlining the scope of their activities. The Committee was actually established by USIB on 27 March 1959 in accordance with the following minute:

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Tab D (Cont'd.)

USIB-M-32, 31 March 1959

Guidance and Support to Certain
Aspects of Space Surveillance
Program and Project SENTRY

After discussion the Board approved the proposed actions set forth in USIB-D-33.6/3, 27 March, subject to certain amendments distributed at the meeting. The Board concurred in the Chairman's nomination of Colonel Macia of the Air Force to serve as chairman of both the Space Surveillance Intelligence Support Committee and the Satellite Requirements Committee established by the Board action. The members also agreed with the Chairman's suggestion that these actions be recognized as only tentative approaches to the important intelligence questions which exist or will arise in these fields and that these problems should be kept under close and continuing review by the Board. In this connection, the members agreed that the two new committees should be instructed to study pertinent questions and, after an appropriate interval, make recommendations with respect to the Board's future approach to intelligence problems in these fields, including questions such as the nature of the subcommittee or other mechanism (e.g., whether existing committees, a combination of existing committees or a single new committee) which should furnish the primary staff support to the Board, and the general allocation within the intelligence community of responsibilities for future work in this field.

During the course of this discussion the Chairman advised the members of the substance of a letter from Mr. Glennan of NASA, bearing on the question of mutual support between the intelligence community and that Agency.

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Tab D (Cont'd.)

Annex to
USIB-M-32 (item 10)
USIB-D-33.6/3 (Rev.)
31 March 1959

C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the U.S. Intelligence Board

SUBJECT : Intelligence Board Guidance and Support to Operational
and to R&D Aspects of the Space Surveillance Program and
the U.S. Reconnaissance Satellite Program.

1. In accordance with informal expressions of the views of various interested members of the intelligence community in conversations pursuant to last Tuesday's Board discussion, General Truscott's Office recommends that the Intelligence Board take the following actions:

a. Establish a Space Surveillance Intelligence Support Committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board which would have the over-all mission of facilitating development and utilization of a national space surveillance system against foreign space vehicles, including SPACE TRACK, for the maximum benefit of the U.S. intelligence community. This Committee would be intended to meet the needs described in General Walsh's memorandum of 19 March, and specifically to discharge appropriate Board and community responsibilities (not already otherwise assigned) in connection with the further handling of substantive intelligence requirements established under regular Board procedures, and the utilization of data.

b. It is further recommended that the Board utilize the existing Ad Hoc Satellite Requirements Committee (established at Air Force invitation 25 April 1958) and re-establish it as the regular Satellite Requirements Committee of the Intelligence Board for providing intelligence guidance and support to U.S. reconnaissance satellite programs, including Project SENTRY -- specifically for discharging appropriate Board and community responsibilities (not already otherwise assigned) in connection with the further handling of substantive intelligence requirements established under regular Board procedures, and the utilization of data.

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Tab D (Cont'd.)

c. It is further recommended that membership on both of the above Committees should be extended to any interested Board members, not now participating, who wish to be so represented. Arrangements should be authorized for participation by other appropriate offices in the U.S. Government on the invitation of the Chairman. Provision for ARPA participation in Committee discussions, when considered appropriate, should be arranged through and under the auspices of General Erskine's office. An appropriate Chairman for each Committee should be designated by the DCI in consultation with and with the concurrence of the Intelligence Board. More detailed terms of reference are not considered necessary or desirable at this time.

2. The above Board actions would provide important continuity in the intelligence community's present support to Projects SPACE TRACK and SENTRY; and would not preclude or prejudice any different or additional arrangements which the Board might wish to undertake at a later date. It is believed such actions (a, b, and c, above) would complete the Board decisions required at this time on General Erskine's letter of 5 March and on Mr. Quarles' earlier letter of 19 February. The Board would accordingly refer recommendations c. of General Erskine's letter to the new Space Surveillance Intelligence Support Committee for its consideration, and refer recommendation b. to GMAIC for appropriate actions under its stated responsibility (under paragraph 4.b. of DCID 3/4) to... "review the scope and effectiveness of collection and production efforts to meet these objectives, and to make the necessary substantive recommendations to the departments and agencies concerned."

3. It is requested that this paper be placed on the agenda for 31 March for Board consideration.

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(Signed)

Assistant to the DM/C

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Tab E

Terms of Reference

Space Surveillance Intelligence Support Committee

30 March 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS, Space Surveillance Intelligence Support Committee

SUBJECT: (U) Mission and Functions of USIB Space Surveillance Intelligence Support Committee (SSISC)

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to state the authority, mission, organization, and function of the USIB SSISC.
2. Authority: Paragraph 10, USIB-M-32, dated 31 March 1959.
3. Mission: To facilitate utilization and development of space surveillance systems for the maximum benefit of the U.S. intelligence community.
4. Membership and Organization: The membership of the Committee is comprised of representatives from departments and agencies which are members of the USIB. Other departments and agencies may be invited by the Chairman to participate as appropriate. The Chairman is appointed by the Chairman, USIB with the concurrence of the USIB.
5. Functions:
 - a. Receive and maintain a central file of intelligence requirements which can be completely, partially or potentially fulfilled through surveillance of in-flight space vehicles, utilizing all available means; accomplish coordination of such requirements with USIB and concerned non-USIB agencies when necessary; determine most effective means for their fulfillment; and assure that all action necessary to formally and appropriately levy them is taken.
 - b. Maintain cognizance of space surveillance activities of USIB and non-USIB agencies which have capabilities for fulfilling intelligence requirements, and assure maximum utilization of such facilities for intelligence purposes.
 - c. Determine, and review on continuing basis, the needs of the intelligence community with respect to facilities, equipment and organizations required to effectively collect intelligence data through surveillance of in-flight space vehicles.

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Tab E (Cont'd.)

d. Provide guidance concerning intelligence community space surveillance interests, requirements and policies to all military and civilian organizations engaged in, or concerned with, operational and/or developmental space surveillance activities.

e. Provide the USIB and all other authorized governmental agencies with coordinated intelligence community recommendations concerning action and policies pertinent to surveillance of in-flight space vehicles.

(Signed)

LOWELL E. MAY
Colonel, USAF
Chairman

* * * * *

The above terms of reference have been informally agreed by the Committee members as outlining the scope of their activities. The Committee was actually established by USIB on 27 March 1959. For this minute see Tab D on the Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee.

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Tab F

Terms of Reference

Ad Hoc Group for ELINT (AGE)

The AGE Committee was established by the acceptance of the military members of USIB of CIA's invitation of 9 September 1959, signed by Richard M. Bissell, Jr., (DD/P) from which the following is extracted:

SUBJECT: ELINT Requirements Requiring Sensitive Collection

1. The National Security Agency, with the concurrence of the ELINT Committee (a subcommittee of the USIB), has indicated its preference for turning over to CIA for collection action those priority ELINT requirements of the community which cannot be satisfied by assets subject to the direction of NSA.

2. It is the belief of CIA that this is proper procedure. However, in order to insure the maximum use of existing assets, the requirements received by CIA from NSA should be screened against US agencies' ELINT collection capabilities of a sensitive or clandestine nature. Where none exist it may be necessary for CIA to proceed with the development of new equipment or operations.

3. As a means of accomplishing the foregoing, I am requesting [] to meet with your representatives from time to time on an informal basis. He has already done so on a problem bearing on Glau. This group, for lack of a better name, I suggest be called the Ad Hoc Group for ELINT (AGE). Unless you perceive some objection to this, may I invite you to name a representative with whom [] may be in touch on these matters.

4. I am very hopeful that by working closely together on these ELINT problems we can avoid wasteful efforts and, what is more important, actually obtain better collection against priority targets.

(Signed)

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

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Tab G

Terms of Reference

Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC)

No formal terms of reference have ever been written out for this Committee. It was originally established by oral inter-agency agreement among the IAC members to develop recommendations for "tasking" CIA's over-flight system, currently known as the U-2 system.

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